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Choice-of-law decisions arise whenever a lawsuit involving
multistate facts is before a court. After the jurisdictional threshold has
been met, the court must determine which state's law should govern
the rights and liabilities of the parties. Generally, the forum court
must decide whether to apply its own state's law or the law of another
state, though a disinterested forum must choose between the laws of
two foreign states.' While jurisdictional doctrines are predominantly
of constitutional origin-due process being the linchpin of jurisdictional theory-choice-of-law theory is an individual state matter.
Each state is free to adopt whatever choice-of-law methodology it
chooses. It is even said that there is no federal law of the conflict of
laws; 2 however, this is a half-truth. Every choice-of-law decision,
whatever its degree of sophistication, must be made in compliance
with the minimum standards required by the constitution. 3 Despite
the diversity of conflicts methods employed by the states, 4 the ideal of
uniformity in conflicts law is approached by the provision for a constitutional floor for every choice-of-law decision. The topic of constitutional limitations on state choice-of-law, however, is fraught with
ambiguities and doubts concerning some of its most basic assumptions. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague, has brought a host of these internal problems to the
fore.
Lavina and Ralph Hague were residents of Hager City, Wisconsin, when Ralph was fatally injured in an automobile accident., Mr.
Hague was a passenger on his son's motorcycle 7 when it was struck
I See,

e.g., Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266

N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
2 Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (federal court to apply
conflicts law of forum state where jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship).
3 See generally Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on States
Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449 (1959).
1 For examples of the many "modern theories" of choice of law, see R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 4-7 (1971).
1 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). See Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Chcice of Law, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 872 (1980). Professor Martin's article on Hague was written just after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and evidences the keen interest that the case has generated among commentators.

. 101 S. Ct. at 636.
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Minn.
, 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (1978), af'd on
rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 50 (1979), af'd, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
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from behind by an automobile operated by another Wisconsin resident. 8 The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, which
lies adjacent to Red Wing, Minnesota. 9 Although Ralph Hague had
been employed in Red Wing for the last fifteen years,' 0 the accident
did not occur in connection with his daily commute to Minnesota."
The trip began and was intended to end in Wisconsin.
Neither Hague's son nor the operator of the other vehicle involved in the accident carried valid automobile liability insurance. 2
3
Hague, however, held a policy with Allstate Insurance Company.'
The policy, which was executed in Wisconsin, '4 covered three automobiles owned by Mr. Hague.' 5 Separate premiums were paid for
each automobile. 6 The policy also contained an uninsured motorist
clause providing for a maximum of $15,000 coverage for each vehicle.' 7 An additional premium was paid for each uninsured provision. 8
After her husband's death, Lavina Hague moved first to Red
Wing and then, upon her remarriage, to Savage, Minnesota. 9 She
was later appointed representative of her late husband's estate by a
Minnesota probate court.2 ° She then brought an action for declaratory relief in Minnesota district court praying that the defendant,
Allstate, stack 2' each of the separate uninsured motorist coverages to
afford her a cumulative coverage of $45,000. Minnesota law unequivocally favored the practice of "stacking." 22 Allstate objected to the

1 101

S. Ct. at 636. Hague's son, the operator of the motorcycle, was also a resident of

Wisconsin. Id.
, Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 641.
11 Id. at 636.
13 Id.
14 Id. Although the policy was delivered
in Wisconsin, Allstate signed the policy at its
headquarters in Northbrook, Illinois. Id. at 641 n.21.
'1 Id. at 636.
16 Id. at 636 n.3.
1'Id. at 636.
1 Id. at 636 n.3.
'9 Id. at 636.
20 Id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota denied the defendant'sjorum non conveniens motion
on the ground, inter alia, that "there [was] no showing that a personal representative [had been]
appointed in Wisconsin." Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co.,_
Minn. ,289 N.W.2d 43, 46
(1979), afJ'd on rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 50 (1979), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
2 "The 'stacking' rule provides that all of the uninsured motorist coverage purchased by an
insured party may be aggregated, or 'stacked,' to create a fund available to provide a recovery
for a single accident." 101 S. Ct. at 648 n.18 (Stewart, J.,concurring).
25 Id. at 636. Minnesota's stacking policy was first enunciated in Van Tassel v. Horace Mann
Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
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application of Minnesota law on the ground that all the events and
persons involved in the litigation pointed to the application of Wisconsin law: 23 The accident occurred in Wisconsin, the insurance
contract was executed in Wisconsin, and all the parties were residents
of Wisconsin at the time of the accident. 24 Since Wisconsin law
25
favored minimum recovery for the victims of uninsured motorists,
the defendant asserted that stacking should not be allowed.
The Minnesota district court rejected the defendant's argument.2 6 The court found Wisconsin's position on the issue of stacking
" 'inimical to the public policy of Minnesota' " and accordingly granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff. 27 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed in Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co. 28 Finding there to
be a conflict of laws,2 the high court of Minnesota applied Professor
Leflar's "choice influencing" approach to resolving such conflicts and
upheld the choice of forum law as the "better rule of law." 30 Upon
S. Ct. at 636.
Id.
25 For Wisconsin's anti-stacking policy, see Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d
558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974) (construing Wis. STAT. § 204.30(5)(a) (1967)). In Hague, the
respondent, Lavina Hague, argued unsuccessfully that the case presented a "false conflict," see
21 101
24

generally R.

LiLAR, AMEaCAN CONFIacTs LAW

188 (3d ed. 1977), on the ground that the status

of Wisconsin's stacking policy was unclear because the statute construed in Nelson had been
amended. Brief for the Respondent at 305, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981). The
amended statute included the following provision:
The uninsured motorist bodily injury coverage limits provided in an automobile
liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance as required in this subsection
shall not be reduced by the terms thereof to provide the insured with less protection
than would be afforded him if he were injured by a motorist insured under an
automobile or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance containing limits provided
in this subsection.
WIs. STAT. § 204.30(5)(a) (1973). The Nelson court did not rule on the effect of this amended
provision. See 63 Wis.2d at 569, 217 N.W.2d at 675. Thus, it was arguable that the as yet
uninterpreted amended Wisconsin statute was potentially in harmony with Minnesota law.
Neither the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
Minn. -,
289 N.W.2d 43, 48 (1978), nor
the Supreme Court of the United States, 101 S. Ct. at 636 n.6, was persuaded that the
respondent's "false conflict" argument was valid. Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically
indicated that only the constitutionality of a state's choice-of-law decision and not the propriety
of the state's conflicts analysis in itself was of concern to the Court. 101 S. Ct. at 636 n.6, 637.
See also id. at 650 (Stewart, J., concurring); note 82 infra.
26 101 S. Ct. at 636.
27 Id. A state is not required to apply the law of a sister state if the foreign law contravenes

the forum's public policy. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979).
28
Minn. , 289 N.W.2d 43 (1978), aff'd on rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 50 (1979),
aft'd, 101 S.Ct. 633 (1981).
29 Id. at
.
, 289 N.W.2d at 47-48.
30 Id. at .
, 289 N.W.2d at 49. See generally Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations
in Conflict Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 298 (1966), and Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on
Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966). Minnesota adopted Professor
Leflar's approach in Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 293 N.W.2d 408 (1973). For other
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rehearing, the supreme court affirmed its earlier decision, dismissing
the defendant's contention that Minnesota's exercise of jurisdiction
violated the due process clause. 3 1 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari 32 to determine whether Minnesota's choice of
lex Jori 33 violated either the due process clause 34 or the full faith and
35
credit clause.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. 36 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, 37 held
that Minnesota's choice of lex Jori was constitutionally sound because
that state had interests 3 8 in the litigation arising from the aggregate of

jurisdictions that have adopted the approach, see Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205
(1966); Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). For criticism of the "better
law" approach, see Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant or: How Not to Review a Restatement,
21 AM. J. CoMp. L. 322, 324 (1973).
31 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Minn. ,
289 N.W.2d 50 (1979).
32 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
33 The term "lex fori"-the law of the forum-indicates the application of the law of the
jurisdiction where relief is sought. BiAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 819 (5th ed. 1979). For a discussion
of the meaning of "law" in the choice-of-law context, see Weintraub, supra note 3, at 462-68
(procedural versus substantive categorization of "law").
3 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in part that: "No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, Without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3' The full faith and credit clause is embodied in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which provides in
full: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1976) provides in part:
Such Acts, records, and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
16 101 S. Ct. at 644.
31 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 635. Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment. Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Powell wrote a
dissenting opinion in which he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 650
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration of the case. Id. at 644.
8 The term "interests" as used in the constitutional sense refers to the government's stake in
the outcome of the litigation before it. See, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493 (1939). The constitutional sense-which is broad and connotative-is to be
distinguished from the use of the term in the choice-of-law context. Thus, "interest-analysis"
refers to a specific methodology for making choice-of-law decisions. See generally Sedler, The
Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181 (1977). As such it is one of many conceptual models invented for that
purpose. See generally R. CRAMTON, B. CutRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1975). It is
a mistake to equate the constitutional sense of "state interests" with "interest-analysis." Whatever affinities the reader may perceive between the two must not have the effect of blurring their
divergent philosophical orientations.
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contacts it had with the parties and the occurrence. 39 Hence, application of forum law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.40 Regardless of the method used by Minnesota in its choice-oflaw decision, 41 that choice did not exceed constitutional limitations
42
under either the due process clause or the full faith and credit clause.
Justice Brennan stated that scrutiny of state choice-of-law decisions begins with an examination of the contacts that the state whose
law was applied had with the parties and occurrences related to the
litigation. 43 Such an examination satisfies both due process and full
faith and credit requirements. 44 Invalidation of a state's choice of
forum law is mandated only where there is neither a significant
contact nor a significant aggregation of contacts existing between the
state and the underlying litigation.4 5 Absent such significant contacts
a state does not have interests in the litigation sufficient to allow the
application of its law.
In a brief outline of major precedents, Justice Brennan indicated
the relation of Hague to both invalidating and validating cases. In the
former category, Home Insurance Co. v. Dick 46 and John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance v. Yates 47 held, respectively, that neither nominal residence nor postoccurrence change of residence qualified as a
significant contact between the state and the underlying litigation. No
state interests were called into play by virtue of such contacts. Justice
Brennan distinguished the holdings of both Dick and Yates, contending that in each case the choice of lex fori "rested exclusively on the
presence of one nonsignificant forum contact, ' 48 which, standing
alone, was insufficient to warrant the selection of forum law. 49 By
contrast, Hague involved a number of state contacts.
In the category of cases which have validated the choice of lex
fori, Justice Brennan likened Hague to three cases. In Alaska Packers
Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,50 the plaintiff, who
suffered an employment-related injury in Alaska, was permitted to
recover under California's workmen's compensation statute on the
1' 101
40

S. Ct. at 644.

Id.

1' Id.

at 637.
,2Id. at 644.
4'
Id. at 637-38, 637 n.10.
44 Id.
41 Id. at 639. See generally Weintraub, supra note 3, at 455-56.
4- 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
41 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
48 101 S.Ct. at 638 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 639.
-o294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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basis of having executed an employment contract in California, the
forum state. In Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,51 a widow
recovered under the forum state's workmen's compensation statute
where her decedent husband had been injured in the course of his
commute from his place of employment in the forum, despite the fact
that the injury occurred outside the forum. Finally, in Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. ,52 the Court allowed the plaintiff to recover
under a property loss insurance policy where the policy provided for
nationwide coverage, the plaintiff had been a resident of the forum
state prior to the loss, the loss occurred in the forum, and the defendant insurance company was present and doing business in the forum
state. Although no unified theory of constitutional scrutiny had been
articulated in the cases cited by the Court, an attempt was made to
organize their several holdings in support of the proposition that due
process and full faith and credit require that the state whose law is to
be applied have interests in the litigation on the basis of having a
significant contact or a significant aggregation of contacts with the
3
parties and the occurrence..
Justice Brennan found three contacts prevailing between Minnesota, the parties, and the occurrence: The decedent had been a longstanding member of Minnesota's workforce; 5 4 the defendant was at all
times present and doing business in Minnesota;5 5 and, the plaintiff
had become a resident of Minnesota prior to the initiation of the
litigation.5 6 The Court held that in the aggregate these contacts
created state interests sufficient to support the selection of forum
law. 5 7 The Court emphasized that it was upholding Minnesota's
choice-of-law decision strictly on the basis of the aggregate of the
5s
contacts found .
The first contact-the decedent's former employment status
within the forum state-called forth Minnesota's police power responsibilities with respect to those employed within the state.5 9 Employment status was held to be an important contact though admittedly

5 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
52 377 U.S. 179 (1964).

5' 101 S. Ct. at 640.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 642.
56 Id. at 643.
57 Id. at 640.
" Id. at 644 & n.29. "We express no view whether the first two contacts, either together or
separately, would have sufficed to sustain the choice of Minnesota law made by the Minnesota
Supreme Court." Id. at 644 n.29.
51 Id. at 640.
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less substantial than resident status. 60 An employee may avail himself
of the services, amenities, and facilities of a state. 6' The state of
employment is also concerned with the well-being and safety of commuters like Mr. Hague.6 2 Finally, despite the fact that Mr. Hague's
death did not create the same state interest that would have been
created by an injury, it affected Minnesota's interest "more acutely"
by extending it to the vindication of the rights of his estate. 63 Although the Court offered no explanation of Minnesota's interest in the
estate of a nonresident employee, it did assert that Ralph Hague's
residence in Wisconsin did not compel the application of Wisconsin

law.6
The second contact-Allstate's corporate presence in Minnesota-implicated the state's interest in the regulation of the insurer's
obligations, particularly as they affected a forum-appointed executrix
who was also a forum resident. 65 Somewhat obliquely, the Court
included Ralph Hague, as a longstanding member of Minnesota's
workforce, within this protected class. 6 Furthermore, the selection
of Minnesota law was not fundamentally unfair to Allstate because as

10Id. at

640-41.
61 Id. at 641.
62 Id. (citing Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 475-76).
61 101 S. Ct. at 641.
64

Id.

Id. at 642-43. The Court relied upon Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313
I1
(1943) (insurance of risks located within forum state), which stated that a state's "interest may be
measured by highly realistic considerations such as the protection of the citizen insured or the
protection of the state from the incidents of loss." Id. at 316.
6 101 S. Ct. at 643. The Court's statement reads in full: "Moreover, Allstate's presence in
Minnesota gave Minnesota an interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations insofar
as they affected both a Minnesota resident and court appointed representative-respondentand a long standing member of Minnesota's workjorce-Mr. Hague." Id. (emphasis added).
Mr. Hague's status as a member of Minnesota's workforce ceased upon his death. But the
Court appeared to imply that Minnesota continues to have interests in Mr. Hague based upon his
employment status even after his death. The Court categorically segregated Minnesota's regulatory interests as to each party and on the basis of each party's distinct status. But could it be said
that Minnesota had interests simultaneously in the plaintiff and the decedent? Its interest in Mrs.
Hague as resident and executrix did not arise until its interest in Mr. Hague as a nonresident
employee had ceased. In fact, Mr. Hague's death was the occasion for if not the cause of Mrs.
Hague's assumption of the role of executrix of his estate and her status as resident of Minnesota.
Thus, if the Court meant to derive state interests from the respective status' of the plaintiff and
the decedent, then the temporal and logical gap between those status' seems to render the
putative interests contradictory. But outside the incongruity of the respective status' of the
parties, it would follow that given a state interest in nonresident employees the state could argue
that it consequently has an interest in the vindication of the rights of the estate of such a deceased
employee. See id. at 641.
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a consequence of doing business in Minnesota, Allstate7 should have
known that it could be sued in the courts of that state.3
The third contact-the plaintiff's pre-litigation change of resi68
dence into the forum-although an inadequate contact in itself,
became relevant when coupled with the fact of Mrs. Hague's appointment as executrix of her late husband's estate. 9 Minnesota had a
vital interest in the administration of Ralph Hague's estate. Also,
given the possibility that Mrs. Hague could become a public charge,
Minnesota had an interest in her recovery. 70 The Court viewed the
plaintiff's post-occurrence residence in the forum state as "bona fide
71
and not motivated by litigation considerations.
In summary, Justice Brennan concluded that on the basis of
Minnesota's contacts with th e parties and the accident, and the resulting state interests, the application of Minnesota law to this litigation
"was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 72 The aggregate
of contacts found in the context of Hague assured that Minnesota's
73
application of its own law was not unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the full
faith and credit clause did not compel Minnesota to apply the law of
Wisconsin to this case.74 The full faith and credit clause protects the
cardinal virtue of the federal system: national unity. 75 As such it
requires a forum to respect the legitimate interests of a sister state by
76
applying the sister state's law to a matter in which it has a stake.

67 id. (citing Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. (Clay I), 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
" 101 S. Ct. at 643-44. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
69 101 S. Ct. at 643.
70 Id. at 644.
7' Id. at 643 n.28. Thus, the danger of forum-shopping was not presented in this case. Id. at
643 & n.28. Contra, id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 644.

73
74

Id.
Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring).

75 Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 100 S. Ct.
2647 (1980); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); R. LEFLAR, supra note
25, § 73, at 143; Sumner, The Full-Faith-and-Credit-Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR.
L. REv. 224, 242 (1955); Weintraub, supra note 3, at 477.
76 101 S. Ct. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring). Of course, full faith and credit is not an
inflexible requirement. Thus, an oft-quoted passage reads:
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to
the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but
cannot be in its own.
Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 547. As a sovereign in its own right the forum would not be
required "to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy." Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
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Yet Justice Stevens found that Wisconsin simply had no interest in an
adjudication of the parties' rights under this contract because the
parties had not relied upon Wisconsin law at the time of contracting. 77 All of the surrounding factors-the lack of a choice-of-law
clause, 78 the nature of the policy, 7 the broad geographical coverage
afforded under the contract 8 0 -signified that there was no justification for either party to expect that Wisconsin law would govern a
dispute arising out of the contract.8 ' Although Minnesota's decision
was "plainly unsound as a matter of normal conflicts law," 8 2 it did not
83
threaten the sovereignty of Wisconsin.
Thus, absent a foreign interest in the litigation, Minnesota could
apply its own law without overreaching.8 4 Furthermore, Justice
77 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens seemed to recognize the
anomaly of basing the full faith and credit analysis-its object being the preservation of national
unity-upon an analysis of the parties' expectations-the traditional due process concern. See id.
at 646 n.11. He cited Yates to demonstrate the concern for the justifiable expectations of
contracting parties in a full faith and credit context. Id. at 646 n. 11. Cf. Freund, Chief Justice
Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. Ray. 1210, 1233 (1946) (describing Yates as the
Court's "most ambitious application of the full faith and credit clause").
78 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring). The contracting parties in this case failed to
covenant for either the application of a particular state's law or for a particular rule of substantive law. Id. But such covenants are not always dispositive. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1930) (parties' expectations under contract provisions upheld) with Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. at 181-82 (choice of lexfori upheld despite contractual provision
to contrary). See also 101 S. Ct. at 648-49 nn.20 & 23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19 101 S. Ct. at 646 n. I1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that while the law of
the place of death should not figure into the interpretation of a life insurance contract, the law of
the locus delicti may very well be relevant to the interpretation of a liability policy. Id. See
generally C. CARNAHAN, CoNF'ucr OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRAcrs, § 15, at 51-52, §
47, at 264-65, 267-68, § 60, at 325-27 (2d ed. 1958). Thus, although Minnesota was not the locus
delicti, the expectation that it could have been, formed at the time of contracting, is enough to
support the application of Minnesota law as a matter of fairness. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
so 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. at
181 (ambulatory nature of contract dispositive factor even though contract contained provision,
valid in place of making, which would have disallowed suit in forum if given effect).
81 101 S. Ct. 646 & n.ll (Stevens, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 646. "Both the execution of the insurance contract and the accident giving rise to the
litigation took place in Wisconsin. Moreover, when both of those events occurred the plaintiff,
the decedent, and the operators of both vehicles were all residents of Wisconsin." Id. It appears
that this statement, which lacks mention of any particular choice-of-law theory, was apparently
intended to show that the major contacts in the case pointed to the application of Wisconsin law
under almost any theory. Additionally, the quoted statement lends support to the distinction
between interests for choice-of-law purposes and interests for constitutional purposes. See note
38 supra.
81 "[Wihile Wisconsin may have an interest in ensuring that contracts formed in Wisconsin
in reliance upon Wisconsin law are interpreted in accordance with that law, that interest is not
implicated in this case." 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring). Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980) (due process restrictions upon exercise of jurisdiction). In World-Wide, the
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Stevens held that the absence of a threat to another sovereign obviated
the need to examine the nature of Minnesota's own interests in the
85
case for full faith and credit purposes.
In a separate analysis,' 8 Justice Stevens held that Minnesota's
choice of lexfori was also permissible as a matter of due process. 87 In
contrast to the full faith and credit concern for national unity, the due
process clause protects the rights of the litigants by insuring that their
88
justifiable expectations are not frustrated by the choice of lex fori.
Only the expectations formed at the time of contracting are relevant
to this inquiry. 8' As noted above, the factors surrounding the contract revealed a distinct lack of expectations regarding the applicable
law.9 0 In addition, the defendant Allstate was presumed to know
that stacking was permitted by a majority of states. 9 1 And inasmuch
as the loss covered by the contract was not geographically limited, the
parties could have anticipated that the law of any state would conceivably apply.2 Justice Stevens also noted that there was a correlation between the rule of stacking and the fact that Mr. Hague had
paid separate premiums for each vehicle and for each uninsured
motorist provision, 93 intimating that the imposition of the stacking
rule did not unfairly expand the contractual obligations of the insurer.
Justice Powell dissented from the Court's opinion largely on the
ground that Minnesota did not have a legitimate interest in the outcome
Court subsumed under the due process clause the function of preserving national unity, which
Justice Stevens attributed exclusively to the full faith and credit clause:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating
in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
Id. at 291-92.
85 101 S. Ct. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring). By contrast, Justice Powell held that the forum
must have interests in the outcome of the litigation in order to constitutionally apply its law. Id.
at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting).
86Justice Stevens treated the due process clause and the full faith and credit clause as
separate considerations. He contended that each posed a different question and protected a
different interest. Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring). Due process may be implemented to
prevent the application of lex fori if the reasonable expectations of the parties would be frustrated by such application. By contrast, the full faith and credit clause compels the forum to
apply the law of a foreign state if the latter's sovereignty would be threatened by the application
of lex fori. Id.
87 Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 648-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90 See notes 78, 79 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
91 101 S. Ct. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92 Id.
83 Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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of the litigation.9 4 He agreed with the plurality's formulation
of the law 9 5 and conceded that Minnesota's choice of lex Jori did not
frustrate the parties' expectations.9"
But, in stark contrast to the plurality's application of the law,
Justice Powell concluded that the full faith and credit clause compelled Minnesota to acquiesce to Wisconsin's legitimate interests in
this litigation.9 7 There, full faith and credit was due to Wisconsin's
law because there was no legitimate state interest that would be
furthered by application of Minnesota's own law. 8 If there had been
some local interest at stake, then Minnesota would not have been
required to sacrifice its interests or to evaluate them in light of Wisconsin's possible interests. 9 Because Minnesota's public policies had
not been stirred by the facts of the case, however, there was no state
'interest in the application of its policy in this instance.' "100
Justice Powell denigrated the contacts found by the plurality.' 0 '
He dismissed the plaintiff's post-occurrence residence in the forum on
the basis of Dick and Yates and added that a contrary holding would
' 10 2
simply make "the invitation to forum shopping ... irresistible."
Moreover, both the defendant's corporate presence and the decedent's
former employment status in Minnesota were rejected as inapposite. 10 3 Minnesota had no interest in regulating Allstate's conduct
"unrelated to the property, persons or contracts executed within

94

Id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).

'5Id. at 650 (Powell, J., dissenting). Like the plurality, Justice Powell did not draw a

distinction between the due process and full faith and credit inquiries. He stated that "both
[clauses] are satisfied if the forum has such significant contacts with the litigation that it has a
legitimate state interest in applying its own law." Id. at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting). But see note
114 infra.
9 101 S. Ct. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, in agreement with the plurality,
id. at 643 n.24 (Powell, J., dissenting), thought it significant that the insurance policy was "not
geographically limited." Id. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting). "Minnesota could have applied its
own law to an accident occurring within its borders .... The fact that the accident did not, in
fact, occur in Minnesota is not controlling because the expectations of the litigants before the
cause of action accrues provide the pertinent perspective." Id. at 652-53 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
91 Id. at 653-54 (Powell, J., dissenting). For analytical support, Justice Powell relied upon
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
91 101 S.Ct. at 653-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting)." '[T]he full faith and credit clause does not require one
state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting
statute of another state.' "Id. (quoting Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 502 (1939) (emphasis added)).
100101 S.Ct. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting B. CuiuuE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 188, 189 (1963).
101 101 S.Ct. at 652-54 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
102 Id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 653-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Minnesota." 104 Likewise, the substantive legal issues in the case were
not "in any way affected or implicated by the insured's employment
status." 105
DISCUSSION
Contact-interest analysis considers the relationship between a
state and the litigation to which that state has applied its own law. It
is the medium through which the constitutional inquiry into choiceof-law questions is effected. Traditionally, that inquiry originated in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the full faith
and credit clause of article IV.10 1 The Hague Court nodded to the
traditional bipartite origin of constitutional limitations on choice-oflaw but hastened to add that the approach under both clauses was
similar. 107 In one sense the Court was correct. Under both clauses the
contact-interest principle has provided the impetus for analysis since
Alaska Packers.10 But a like approach under both clauses does not
force the conclusion that both clauses protect the same interests or
even that the same result is inevitable under both clauses.10 9 Given
the proper analytical distinction between the two clauses it is conceivable that a forum state may be required to apply the law of another
state under the full faith and credit clause despite the fact that either
state may have applied lex ori as a matter of due process. 110
The Hague Court premised its merger of due process and full
faith and credit upon the view that the Court has retreated from the
position of applying a higher standard under the full faith and credit
clause."' The Court based this conclusion on the abandonment of
the discredited balancing of interests approach of Alaska Packers.
While it is undoubtedly true that Alaska Packers no longer represents
104Id. at 653 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943)). See note 65 supra.
105 101 S. Ct. at 654 (Powell, J.,dissenting). But see, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). It must be noted that employment status in both Pacific Insurance and
Alaska Packers figured as a contact between the forum state and the plaintiff who suffered an
employment-related injury and sought recovery under the forum's workmen's compensation act.
106 See generally Weintraub, supra note 3.
107 101 S. Ct. at 637 & n.10 (plurality).
108 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
109 See generally Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of
Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94 (1976); Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978).
110 See Reese, supra note 109, at 1590 nn.18-23 and accompanying text.
"1 101 S.Ct. at 637 n.10.
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an accepted approach to full faith and credit, 112 this does not necessarily imply that the interests of another involved state may never figure
into a court's analysis under the full faith and credit clause."13 If
there is no practical difference between the due process clause and the
full faith and credit clause, then it is superfluous to maintain that both
clauses are satisfied under the same criteria.
Hague may have sounded the death knell of the full faith and
credit clause as an independent limitation on choice of law. Justice
Stevens and Justice Powell, however, did recognize an analytical
distinction between the due process and full faith and credit questions. 1 4 Contrary to the suggestions of commentators that one or the
other of the clauses be made the exclusive constitutional reference," 5
112 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Some years prior to the Carroll decision,
Justice Jackson had written that
[O]nly a singularly balanced mind could weigh relative state interests . . . except by
resort to what are likely to be strong preferences in sociology, economics, governmental theory, and politics. There are no judicial standards of valuation of such
imponderables. How can we know which is the greater interest when one state is
moved by one set of considerations-economic, perhaps-to one policy, and another
by different considerations-social welfare, perhaps-to a conflicting one.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L.Rsv. 1,
28 (1945). It may be added that faith and credit toward sister-state judgments presents a concern
different from faith and credit to foreign law. 100 S. Ct. at 637 n. 10. For the most recent case
involving recognition of judgments, see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 100 S. Ct. 2647
(1980). As Justice Jackson wrote:
Questions as to faith and credit for foreign law seem inherently more difficult than
questions as to recognition of judgments. There is comparatively little trouble to
whom and to what a judgment applies, for that is what the very process of adjudication settles. But the effect to be given to the law of a sister state generally turns on
whether the state itself has the right to reach and govern a particular transaction, or
property, or person, because of some relationship which confers what roughly may
be described as 'legislative jurisdiction.'
Jackson, supra, at 11.
13 See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 645-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
I" Justice Stevens explicitly separated the constitutional analyses under both clauses. See id. at
644 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Justice Powell did not consciously separate the lines of
inquiry, see note 95 supra, the structure of his opinion strongly suggests that his conclusion rested
upon his view of the full faith and credit clause. On one hand, Justice Powell accepted the
plurality's view "that both . . . [c]lauses are satisfied if the forum has such significant contacts
with the litigation that it has a legitimate interest in applying its own law." 101 S. Ct. at 651
(Powell, J., dissenting). He then asserted that the contacts analysis was guided by two constitutional policies: Lexjori must not frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties; and, there
must be legitimate forum interests in the outcome of the litigation. Id. Finding no frustration of
the parties' expectations, id. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting), Justice Powell based his dissent upon
his view that the contacts found by the plurality did not further "any public policy in Minnesota." Id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting). His discussion of "legitimate interests" concentrated
upon the requirements of the full faith and credit clause. See id. at 651-52 (Powell, J., dissenting). See notes 117 to 125 infra and accompanying text.
15 Compare Kirgis, supra note 109 (due process), with Martin, supra note 109 (full
faith and
credit).
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both Justices developed separate lines of inquiry under each clause. Of
these, Justice Powell's theory presents a more workable and realistic
6
standard. 11
Justice Powell, in his dissent, asserted that the full faith and
credit clause does not require a forum to apply the law of another
interested state if the forum has a legitimate interest in the outcome of
the litigation." 7 Such an interest exists where the forum has a legitimate public policy that would be furthered by the application of lex
.for/."8 The test for determining whether a policy of the forum is at
stake in a particular instance is whether "the facts to which the rule
will be applied have created effects within the State, toward which
the State's public policy is directed." I" In other words, do the contacts that exist "between the forum and the litigation . . . form a
20
reasonable link between the litigation and a state policy"?
Justice Powell's full faith and credit theory avoids such pitfalls as
the discredited practice of balancing state interests ' 2 and the dependence upon party reliance on state law. 2 2 He focuses upon the existence of a valid public policy to which the facts of the case are directly
tied. The theory looks to a meaningful relationship between the activities under review and the state interests allegedly implicated. Absent its own legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation, the
forum should defer to the law of the state that has such related
116Justice Stevens urged that the full faith and credit clause provides a distinct question to be
asked in choice-of-law cases: Is the forum required to apply the law of another interested state?
101 S.Ct. at 64 (Stevens, J., concurring). The thrust of the clause is an affirmative command, a
directive. See also Reese, supra note 109, at 1590. The test he offered was whether the application of lexiori "threatened the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon
the legitimate interests of" another state. 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted). Originally, the full faith and credit clause was intended to provide a principle of
unification for our federalist system. See generally Sumner, supra note 75, at 242. The states are
related to one another as coequal sovereigns. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). Where there is a threat to the sovereignty of a sister state, the federal
concern for unification arises. As noted above, Justice Stevens held that Wisconsin's interests
were not implicated in this litigation because the parties had not relied upon Wisconsin law in
their contract. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. Aside from the questionability of the
reliance argument, see note 134 infra and accompanying text, it is suggested that the threat-tonational-unity test, though consistent with the historical origin of the full faith and credit clause,
may prove an unworkable standard. Justice Stevens found no threat to national unity precisely
because he found no reliance upon Wisconsin law. He offered nothing beyond the reliance test
by which to assess the threat to national unity posed in a state choice-of-law decision.
...101 S. Ct. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118Id.

Id. at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
'2 Under Justice Powell's view, full faith and credit requires an introspective assessment of
the forum state's own interests in the litigation, rather than a comparison of these interests with
those of another state. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
'21See note 134 infra and accompanying text.
"
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interests. 123 Additionally, if both states have related interests, full
faith and credit will not operate to deprive the forum of the opportunity to further its parochial interests. Thus, although the danger of
forum-shopping exists in some degree, 124 it is checked by the legitimate forum interests at stake. Because this means that the facts of the
case are tied to the forum in some way, it is presumed that the parties
25
would have expected that state to become involved.
Although the full faith and credit analyses differed, the due
process inquiry in each of the separate opinions was essentially the
same. The focus in each was upon whether Minnesota's choice of
forum law frustrated the parties' justifiable expectations as formed
before the cause of action accrued. 26 It was noted, for instance, that
the insurance contract between Allstate and Ralph Hague provided
for nationwide coverage. 2 7 Furthermore, the insurer was aware of
Ralph Hague's daily commutation to Minnesota. 28 Taken together,
these facts indicated that "there was a reasonable probability that the
risk would materialize in Minnesota." 29 The expectation formed by
this probability was made at the time of contracting and was unaffected by the fortuity of the actual locus delicti. 30 It was further
noted that at the time of contracting, the parties failed to covenant
either for the application of the law of a particular state or for a
particular substantive rule of law concerning the question of stacking. '3' The plurality added to this analysis that, as a consequence of
doing business in Minnesota, the defendant Allstate was aware of its
32
own amenability to suit in that state.
Several aspects of the due process arguments put forth deserve
comment. Justice Stevens, finding it significant that the parties had
not relied upon Wisconsin law when executing their contract, concluded that "Wisconsin['s] . . .interest in ensuring that contracts
formed in Wisconsin in reliance upon Wisconsin law are interpreted
123 101

S. Ct. at 652 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (citing Yates as illustrative of this principle).

124 Presumably, the plaintiff could shop for favorable law limiting his choice of fora to states

that have a bare minimum of the required interest in the outcome of the litigation while
excluding states with greater interests but unfavorable law. Absent a workable and realistic
balancing of interests test, see note 112 supra, there is no check upon this less egregious brand of
forum-shopping.
125 Hence, the expectations of the parties would not have been frustrated as long as it was
foreseeable that the forum was even minimally tied to the litigation.
126101 S. Ct. at 648-49 (Stevens, J., concurring); id.at 651 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128Id. at 652 (Powell, J., dissenting).
129 Id.
130 Id.

at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).
at 648-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 642-43 (plurality).
131 Id.
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in accordance with that law" was not implicated.1 33 In other words,
Wisconsin's potential interests did not come into being simply because
the parties had not relied upon its law in the contract. But to predicate the existence of state interests upon the reliance of the parties is
ill-conceived. 3 4 State interests either exist or do not exist. It is anomalous to deny the furtherance of legitimate public policies on the
ground that the lack of party reliance renders the underlying state
35
interests inoperative.1
An objection may also be entered against the view that the
absence of party expectations at the time of contracting justifies the
conclusion that there is no frustration of expectations when a state
other than that of locus contractus applies its law to the contract.
There is a degree of artificiality in the logic of saying that because
36
there were no expectations, no expectations could be frustrated.1
Indeed, the policy's coverage was not geographically limited. 3 7 But
it might be argued that in light of the policy's unlimited coverage the
only reasonable expectation that could have been formed was that the
insured would be entitled to compensation for injuries suffered in
another state. It does not follow that the parties would thereby expect
the law of the foreign state to automatically apply to the interpretation of the contract. 3 8 Because the issue is not one of tort, the
concept of locus delicti should not have been a factor. As stated above,
133Id. at 648-49 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
13 See id. at 654 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"I A related issue is the questionable value of a covenant for the application of a substantive

rule of law such as stacking in a contract executed in a state where such a rule contravenes public
policy. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) ("the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a state to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy")
(footnote omitted). See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTAcrs § 1375 (One Vol. Ed. 1952).
Thus, had the parties covenanted for an anti-stacking provision in the standard insurance
contract, they could not have expected a pro-stacking state, such as Minnesota, to enforce the
contractual term. Similarly, a pro-stacking contractual clause would contravene the law of
Wisconsin, the locus contractus. Hence, even though Allstate could have reasonably relied upon
an anti-stacking clause executed in Wisconsin, that expectation would by necessity be frustrated
in Minnesota. It is unlikely that the Hague plurality would have reached a different result given
either contractual provision. Indeed, the very notion that private covenants are of constitutional
significance is overestimated. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
1 The Respondent, Lavina Hague, pushed the logic of the expectation argument to its limit
in saying that at the time of contracting "none of the circumstancesof a loss is known and thus it
is impossiblefor one to form any expectations. " Brief for the Respondent at 8, Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not reiterate this but
contented itself to note that "[tihere [was] no element of unfair surprise or frustration of
legitimate expectations as a result of Minnesota's choice of its law." 101 S.Ct. at 643 n.24.
'37 See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
"3 The modern trend away from the rigidity of traditional concepts such as locus delicti
supports this point. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963) (original case in this line).
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it was additionally noted that the insurer knew of Ralph Hague's daily
journey to Minnesota.13 9 Thus, the likelihood of Minnesota's potential interest in applying its law was great.
Objection can be made to the use of Hague's commutation as a
dispositive element of the parties' expectations. It might be argued
that the insurer should have reasonably expected the application of
Minnesota law to a case where the insured was injured in the course of
his ride to or from work. On the contrary, there is no basis upon
which to assume that the insurer would expect Minnesota law to
apply where, except for Hague's commutation, there was no other
factual connection with Minnesota. To illustrate, if Hague lived at the
juncture of three states and commuted from state A to two separate
part-time jobs, one in state B and the other in state C, then the
importance of the commutation to B would be diminished where B
applied its law to an accident occurring in C. 140
Finally, Allstate's corporate presence in Minnesota rendered it
amenable to suit there.' 41 "But," as Justice Powell indicated, "this
argument proves too much." 42 Indeed, Allstate, by doing business in
all fifty states, was amenable to suit in all of those states. 43 The
139

See note 128 supra and accompanying text.

"I The potential interests of B, as a state to which an employee commuted, would not be
evoked where the employee was injured while commuting to C. Bs interest in its commuters
cannot logically be implicated to the same extent as C's interest in its commuters where the focal
event, the accident, occured in C. In such a situation, when two states claim the same contact,
there must be a "hierarchy of interests" that would dictate the content or value of the contact as
between the competing states. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 227, 230-33 (1967). The seed of Hague's use of state
interests in the abstract may be found in the Court's earlier statements, such as, "[The forum]
therefore has a legitimate interest in opening her courts to suits of this nature, even though in this
case [the plaintiff's] injury may have cast no burden on her institutions." Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408, 413 (1954). In Carroll, however, the forum was factually connected to the injury
inasmuch as it was the locus delicti.
141 101 S. Ct. at 642-43.
142 Id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143 Consider the attitude of the Court in its recent statement, in the context of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction, that
State Farm [the defendant] is 'found,' in the sense of doing business, in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Under Appellee's theory, the 'debt' owed to Rush
would be 'present' in each of those jurisdictions simultaneously. It is apparent that
such a 'contact' can have no jurisdictional significance.
Rush v. Savchuck, 100 S. Ct. 571, 578 (1980). Admittedly, the quasi-in-rem context of Rush
provides the conceptual background for this statement. Jurisdiction over the defendant was
sought by means of a Seider-type attachment of his insurer's debt to him. See generally Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner:
The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 33, 90-99 (1978). Nonetheless, the close attention paid by
the Court to the quality and nature of the ties between the forum and the parties for purposes of
jurisdiction stands in contrast to the lack of such attention on the part of the Hague Court for
purposes of choice-of-law. Cf. Silberman, supra, at 79-90 (choice-of-law more determinative
than exercise of jurisdiction regarding rights and liabilities of parties).
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plurality derived the defendant's expectations as to the applicability of
Minnesota law from its expectations as to its amenability to in personam jurisdiction.144 This subtle intermixing of two distinct concerns, 145 although not irrational, was inappropriate in this instance
because no other material facts pointed to the application of Minnesota law. It becomes meaningless to say that a corporation should
expect that the law of any state in which it does business may be
applied to its conduct and obligations unrelated to the forum.14
The major difficulty presented by the Hague Court's contact-interest approach 147 is the notion that an aggregation of otherwise
attenuated contacts is sufficient to support the selection of lex fori. 148
The Court expressly viewed the contacts of residence, employment,
9
and presence as significant only in their aggregation. 14
In a footnote,
the Court specifically added that it expressed no opinion as to whether
employment or presence, "either together or separately," would have
sufficed.150 Standing alone, the plaintiff's residence was undoubtedly
inadequate under Yates 151 and Dick. 5 2 Yates, moreover, viewed
post-occurrence change of residence as insignificant in itself and made
no attempt at aggregating such residence with corporate presence,
which was the jurisdictional contact in that case. 153 The doctrine
that emerges from the aggregation approach is quite radical: a cluster

144

See note 67 supra and accompanying text.

"I See 101 S. Ct. at 642 n.23.
46 One commentator has stressed that "[t]he impact of a conflicts of law decision more
seriously affects the rights of the parties than a decision on jurisdiction." Silberman, supra note
143, at 82.
147 The phrase "contact-interest" refers to the method of locating the state's interest in
the
litigation through an examination of the factual contacts between the state and the parties and
events underlying the case. See generally B. CUaRSE, supra note 100.
148 Ideally, the emphasis in a contact-interest analysis should be upon the significance of the
interests discovered and not upon the counting of contacts. Although the Hague Court articulated conceivable state interests in the litigation, its analysis is better described as a "minimum
contacts" approach. Cf. 101 S. Ct. at 654 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("this case cannot be
justified by the existence of relevant minimum contacts"). "Minimum contacts," of course, refers
to the requirement that the forum state support its exercise of jurisdiction by having a minimum
level of contact with the defendant. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). When used in the context of choice-of-law the phrase "minimum contacts" is used in a
much looser sense, referring to the state's various contacts with either the plaintiff or the
defendant, or with the events that gave rise to the case. Such usage often clouds the sense that is
intended. In describing the Hague Court's analysis as an adoption of the minimum contacts
model, the point intended is that the decision concentrates upon the existence of factual contacts
instead of the quality of the interests that were said to arise by virtue of these contacts.
141 101 S. Ct. at 644 & n.29.
'm Id. at 644 n.29.
5' See note 47 supra.
152 See note 46 supra.
"I See 101 S.Ct. at 653 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of individually nonsignificant contacts is significant for constitutional
purposes. The otherwise empty contacts somehow gather content
when grouped as a whole.
The criticism that the contacts and resulting interests extolled by
the Hague Court were inadequate to support the application of Minnesota law due to a lack of "relatedness" to the underlying litigation
applies across the board. The Court found that by virtue of the
decedent's prior employment status that the forum's police power
responsibilities were called into play. 154 But the opinion is devoid of
any indication as to the nature of these police power responsibilities
and what state interest they engender.
The Court reasoned that although the decedent was not a resi1 55
dent of Minnesota he was a "commuting nonresident employee."
Thus, employment status, although concededly indicative of lesser
state interests than resident status,1 56 qualified as a viable contact. The
fact that the accident did not occur in connection with Ralph Hague's
daily commute to Minnesota did not present an obstacle to the Court.
Justice Brennan rebuffed the lack of a connecting factor between the
contact and the facts by noting that "an automobile accident need not
occur within a particular jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected to the occurrence." 1 57 In other words, the locus delicti is not
of controlling constitutional value. But in each of the cases cited in
support of this proposition the forum was either the residence of the
accident victim at the time of the injury or death, 58 or it was the locus
of the employment contract upon which the victim sought recovery in
an employment-related injury.' 5 9 In each of those cases, the derogation of locus delicti was incidental to the discovery of state interests on
the basis of other contacts or connecting factors. In Hague, the Court
merely waved the discrediting of the concept of locus delicti as justification for the forum-contact of employment status. 60
- 101 S. Ct. at 640.
155Id. at 641.
"1
Id. at 640.
Is'Id. at 640, 641 nn.19 & 20.
158See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Clark
v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394,
301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
I" See Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
'0 The Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he occurrence of a crash fatal to a Minnesota employee in another State is a
Minnesota contact. If Mr. Hague had only been injured and missed work for a few
weeks the effect on the Minnesota employer would have been palpable and Minnesota's interest in having its employee made whole would be evident. Mr. Hague's
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The workmen's compensation cases provide an example of the
use of a contact such as employment status as a "related" contact. For
instance, in Alaska Packers, California was faced with a Hobson's
choice regarding the claim made by a nonresident alien who was
injured in Alaska: either make the injured party whole or accept him
as a public charge.'6' This "choice" was based upon the fact that it is
not customary for one state to enforce the compensation laws of
another state. 8 2 Thus, because California was not the locus delicti,
its obvious interests in making the plaintiff whole had to be grounded
in some other contact. The plaintiff's execution of his employment
contract in California filled this need. The locus of the employment
contract, and, a fortiori, of the employment relationship, qualified as
a significant contact for the underlying employment-related injury.1 8 3 The Court allowed the forum to apply its law despite the
absence of contact with the injury; it did so on the basis of the crucial
interests of the forum that were at stake. Citing Alaska Packers, the
Hague Court stated that employment status is an important contact
creating state interests. 8 4 Why such was the case in Alaska Packers is
clear. The contact of employment status, however, loses all of the
significance it had in Alaska Packers when transplanted into the facts
of Hague.165
The contact of "commuting" provides another example of the
Court's use of "established" contacts in an incongruous setting.18 In
Cardillo, the Court expended much effort determining whether the
accident therein had occurred "in the course of employment," a prerequisite to the operation of the compensation statute involved. 8 7 In

death affects Minnesota's interest still more acutely, even though Mr. Hague will not
return to the Minnesota workforce. Minnesota's workforce is surely affected by the
level of protection the State extends to it, either directly or indirectly. Vindication of
the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee, therefore, is an important state
concern.
101 S. Ct. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
B. Cutm, supra note 100, at 202. See Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 542.
1861
162 B. CUBRME, supra note 100, at 202.
163 Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 540-41.
161101 S. Ct. at 639.
165It may be further noted that liability under workmen's compensation acts is not grounded
in tort, but in a status-related cause of action "imposed as an incident of the employment
relationship." Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 541. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145, 158 (1932). Thus, the Hague facts are not only distinguishable because this
status-related cause of action was absent, but also because Mr. Hague's status was totally
unrelated to the cause of action in issue, which was based on liability on an insurance contract
where the status of the insured as one who is covered by the policy is uncontested.
I'G 101 S. Ct. at 639-40.
11' Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 478-79.
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that context, the fact that the plaintiff was injured while commuting
from his job in the foreign state to his home in the forum state became
significant. 68 In Hague, the Court read Cardillo as having given
some constitutional significance to "commuting" as a contact in itself. 6
The interest of a state in the recovery of a person likely to become
a public charge was used in Hague to support the plaintiff's residence
in the forum as a contact. 170 But rejection of lex fori would not have
resulted in the plaintiff's automatic reliance upon the support of the
state. The precise issue in Hague was not whether the plaintiff would
recover at all, but how much she would recover.'17 If Wisconsin law
were applied, the plaintiff was bound to recover a lesser amount.
Moreover, the rejection of lex fori would not have extinguished the
plaintiff's cause of action. Thus, it is difficult to see how the danger of
forum-shopping is not the consequence of holding that a post-occurrence residence in the forum state is sufficient to implicate the maximum-recovery policy of that state in an accident that occurred elsewhere between residents of another state.
The jurisdictional contact of the defendant's corporate presence
was also unrelated to the facts of the case.172 The Court held that the
business activities of Allstate in Minnesota evoked the regulatory interests of that state in Allstate's obligations toward a Minnesota resident. 73 If this was intended to mean that Minnesota had an interest
in the plaintiff's recovery, then the jurisdictional contact adds nothing
to the contact of the plaintiff's residence. As noted above, the rejection
of lex fori would not have resulted in the extinguishment of the
plaintiff's cause of action against the insurer. Moreover, there was no
evidence that Allstate contested its liability toward the plaintiff. On
the other hand, if Minnesota's regulatory interest in Allstate's insurance obligations toward the plaintiff refers to its obligations under the
laws of Minnesota, then the argument is truly circular. Under this
interpretation, the Court would be deriving the constitutionality of
lex Jori from the parochial desire of a state to effectuate its own
policies.' 74 Thus, under the guise of calling this a regulatory interest,
10 Id. at 482-83.

,6OSee 101 S. Ct. at 639-41.
170 Id. at 644.
171 See id. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting). Cf. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 542 (absent
recovery in forum, plaintiff would have no remedies).
112See 101 S. Ct. at 642-43.
173 Id. Contra, id. at 653 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Hay, The Interrelation of
Jurisdictionand Choice-of-Law, 28 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 161, 164 (1979) ("amenability to suit
as a consequence of doing business" should be conceptually linked to substantive issue).
174 It is noteworthy that Hague involved the constitutionality of a choice-of-law decision made
pursuant to a conflicts theory that virtually compels the selection of lex fori. Admittedly, the
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the Court would simply be endorsing a particular state policy. There
was no showing that Allstate did anything in Minnesota with regard
to the plaintiff or the decedent that would implicate Minnesota's
regulatory interests in Allstate's relationship to these parties.1 75
It has been stated throughout the foregoing discussion that in
Hague the Court used the jurisdictional contact of the defendant's
corporate presence in the forum as one of the aggregated contacts
supporting the application of lex fori.176 This aspect of the case has
great significance to the controversy over the interrelation of jurisdiction and choice-of-law theories. 177 A brief statement of that controversy will show Hague's bearing upon the issue.
Jurisdiction and choice-of-law may be viewed as two aspects of
the same problem.1 78 In a controversy involving foreign facts, the
forum court is presented with the interrelated issues of its own exercise
of jurisdiction, the duty to recognize foreign law, and the applicability of foreign or forum law. 179 At first glance, it appears that the purely
constitutional issue does not require consideration of the underlying conflicts method. Nonetheless, it is anomolous that a decision may be "plainly unsound as a matter of normal conflicts
law," 101 S. Ct. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring), yet pass constitutional muster.
It has often been remarked that whereas a judge is an "expert" in applying lexfori, he is a
"dilettante" in applying foreign law. See Zweigert, Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private InternationalLaw or: What is Justice in the Conflict of Laws?, 44 U. COLO. L.
REv. 283, 293 (1973). See also 101 S. Ct. at 647 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225-26 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). But see Hay, supra note
173, at 162 n.3. Moreover, even if foreign law were easily ascertained, it is a formidable task to
determine what state policies underlie any rule of law, particularly if it is foreign. See Sedler,
supra note 38, at 194-201. Thus, the natural tendency in choice-of-law is not altruism. But under
the rubric of Professor Leflar's "better law" approach, see note 30 supra, this natural predilection for lex fori becomes dogma. Cf. R. CrAMTON, B. CUME & H. KAY, supra note 38, at 323
("The experience thus far suggests that judicial use of the 'better law' approach seems to tend
irresistibly toward application of forum law").
Therefore, the use of "regulatory interests" in support of the choice of lex fori, particularly
where that choice was made pursuant to the "better law" approach, subserves the parochialism
of the lexfori approach. Cf. Hay, supra note 173, at 174 (use of governmental-interest approach
in area of jurisdiction replaces "the jurisdictionalterritorialism of Pennoyer v. Neff" with "the
new territorialism of the lex fori") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
" Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977) ("if Delaware perceived its interest in
securing jurisdiction [on the grounds alleged] . . . .we would expect it to have enacted a statute
more clearly designed to protect that interest").
76 For the related question as to the derivation of jurisdiction from choice-of-law contacts, see
Hay, supra note 173, at 161.
1"7 See generally Ehrenzweig, The TransientRule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 290-92 (1956); Hay, supra note 173, at 161; Martin,
supra note 5; Martin, supra note 109, at 201-03; Reese, supra note 111, at 1588-89; Sedler,
Judicial Jurisdictionand Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L.
REv. 1031 (1978); Silberman, supra note 143, at 79-90; von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1128-33 (1966).
"'8 See Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori
Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
17 G. STUMBEaG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICr OF LAWS 1 n.l (3d ed. 1963).
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introspective determination of jurisdiction 8 ° logically precedes the
need to treat the choice-of-law issue. Certainly, if the jurisdictional
issue is resolved against the forum, then the choice-of-law issue becomes moot. 8 1 But the logical sequence is illusory. If forum-shopping means anything it is that choice of forum carries with it an a
18 2
priori choice of forum law. Forum-oriented choice-of-law models,
escape devices,1 83 and at least one wing of the interest-analysis approach 184 are some of the ways by which lex fori becomes almost
dictated by the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, it is significant that the
Hague Court placed its constitutional imprimatur upon the applicability of lex fori as a consequence of pre-existing jurisdiction. Ever
since Hanson v. Denckla, 85 the Court has maintained that the converse is not true; that is, jurisdiction does not exist merely as a consequence of the applicability of lex fori. 88
In Hague, in personam jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained by virtue of Allstate's corporate presence in the state. Thus,
jurisdiction was based upon the activities unrelated to the underlying
litigation. 1 87 This jurisdictional contact, like transitory jurisdiction, 18 8 is a lower level minimum contact. 89
180See generally Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HsAv. L. REV. 909
(1960).
1s1
Cf. 101 S. Ct. at 644 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) (choice-of-law issue arises only after
there exists jurisdiction).
182 E.g., B. CUFUuE, supra note 100 (interest analysis); A. EHRENZWEIG, PUVATE INTERNA(1974) (proper law in proper forum); Leflar, supra note 30 (choice-influencing
considerations).
183 See generally R. CRAMTON, B. CuRuuE, & H. KAY, supra note 38, at 61-143. For example,
Ehrenzweig noted that
[t]here islittle disagreement as to the unsatisfactory state of our conflicts law bearing
upon the statute of limitations. It now seems settled that any state is free to apply its
own statute rather than that under which the cause of action arose. Yet by applying
the local statute a court may deny the valid claim of a nonresident creditor who was
compelled by our law of personal jurisdiction to follow his debtor into the state of
the forum. On the other hand, a court may offer its own law for the revival of a stale
claim by a nonresident creditor who, again by our law of personal jurisdiction, was
enabled to 'catch' his unwary debtor in the state of the forum.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 177, at 291 (footnotes omitted).
"" In the case of a "true conflict," Currie insists that the forum not sacrifice its own interests
by preferring the interests of another state. See Sedler, supra note 38, at 188-89.
183 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
"[The State] does not acquire .. .jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the
TIONAL LAW

controversy, or the most convenient location for the litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction,
not choice of law." Id. at 254. Accord, Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977). Contra, Silberman, supra note 143, at 88 ("If a court has the
power to apply its own law, it should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the action")
(emphasis in original).
187 See generally Martin, supra note 5.
IS See B. CunmE, supra note 100, at 283-360; Ehrenzweig, supra note 177.
Is In Martin's terminology, "minimum contacts" at the lower level refer to contacts unrelated
to the case. See Martin, supra note 5, at 872 nn.1 & 2.
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Absent this tenuous connection with the forum state, Allstate
could not have otherwise been sued in Minnesota given the facts of the
case. 9 0 Thus, the factors that make it reasonable to exercise such
jurisdiction are not the same factors that make it reasonable to apply
forum law. 1 1 For example, long-arm jurisdiction is predicated upon
the effects created in the state by the defendant.19 2 These effects arise
from the same facts that gave rise to the underlying litigation. It is
reasonable, under the theory of long-arm jurisdiction, to subject the
defendant to the laws of the state in which he has created effects. But
jurisdiction founded upon "doing business" within a state is likely to
require the defendant to defend against claims unrelated to the forum. It is a significant extension of this doctrine to hold that the
defendant's rights and liabilities arising from the non-forum related
claim may be adjudicated according to the law of the forum.
CONCLUSION
Under the contact-interest approach, the exercise of locating contacts is not an end in itself. Rather, it culminates and has for its
9 3
purpose the finding of state interests in the litigation under review.1
It is ultimately on the basis of state interests that the constitutional
inquiry into choice-of-law rests. A court's resolution of a conflict may
be patently "unsound as a matter of normal conflicts of law," 114 yet
remain constitutionally inviolable; the constitutional inquiry does not
turn upon the integrity of the choice-of-law decision itself. 1 5 Although Hague correctly identified these general principles of the scope
of constitutional review, it subtly changed the course of their evolution. Hague permitted the selection of lex fori on the basis of state
interests that bore little or no relation to the facts of the litigation. 196

190Id. at 873.
1'9 See Sedler, supra note 177, at 1032. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
192Sedler, supra note 177, at 1032.
'91 101 S. Ct. at 637-38 & n.10.
'9
Id. at 646 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
'15 See e.g., Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916), where the Court wrote:
The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the state court made a mistaken
application of doctrines of the conflict of laws in deciding that the cancellation of a
land contract is governed by the law of the situs instead of the place of making and
performance. But that, being purely a question of local common law, is a matter
with which this court is not concerned.
Id. For critical comment on this oft-quoted passage, see B. CURIUE, supra note 100, at 268-69.
I" The Court concentrated upon party contracts-corporate presence, employment status,
residence-to the exclusion of the candidate jurisdiction's contacts with the occurrences and the
transactions that gave rise to the case.
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Minnesota had only specious interests at stake. 19 7 The Court's uncritical view of the substantive value of these interests undermines the
efficacy of constitutional restraints on choice-of-law. 9 8 At the same
time, the decision's lack of a clear theoretical underpinning for its
aggregation approach renders its precedential value uncertain. 99
There is simply no rational rule of thumb by which to delineate either
the minimum aggregate of nonsignificant contacts allowable under
Hague or the extent to which a state's interests may be tangential
without making the selection of lex fori unconstitutional.
The aggregation approach to contacts presents a conceptual
problem: How can the aggregate of contacts be significant while the
individual contacts are not? Obviously, the premise of the theory
cannot be that by merely aggregating contacts they magically become
"significant." The gist of the contact-interest approach is that there
are state interests in the litigation arising from the contacts that the
state has with the parties and occurrence or transaction.2 00 Therefore, despite the inadequacy of individual contacts, each must have
some relative significance to the extent that it is the bearer of one or
more state interests. Regardless of its inadequacy outside the quantum, each contact must be of a certain quality when considered as
part of the whole. The complexity of the constitutional inquiry is
based in part upon the fact that there is no closed-system of contacts
that invariably compels or denies the application of lex fori. No one
contact has been raised by the Court to constitutional dignity for all
circumstances. If the Hague Court has properly read the evolution of
constitutional limitations on choice-of-law, then it is clear that state
interests may arise from even the most tenuous contacts.
One virtue of Hague is the sensitivity the Court displayed to the
notion that no one isolated fact is of controlling constitutional significance. 20 ' On the basis of cases like Alaska Packers, it is clear, for
instance, that locus delicti has no such controlling force.20 2 But the
197 This is not to suggest that the weighing-of-interests approach followed in cases like Alaska
Packers should be resuscitated. Lex fori could be disallowed not because the forum has lesser
interests as compared to the foreign state but because the forum's interests fall short of a
minimum standard. If the weighing-of-interests approach were feasible it would merely serve to
determine a quantitative value. But interests may be "weighed" or compared qualitatively. See
Carrington & Martin, supra note 140, at 231-33.
"98The demise of the minimal control of choice-of-law provided by due process and full faith
and credit raises the fear that "conflicts law [will] be left forever to the 'local' whim of the
forum." Ehrenzweig, supra note 177, at 292.
I" That is, although the Court reviewed the applicable law governing this type of case, it
neither documented nor explained the theoretical foundation of the aggregate theory.
200 See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955).
201 See 101 S. Ct. at 641 n.21, 642 n.22 (plurality).
2 See B. CumE, supra note 100, at 201, showing how Alaska Packers simultaneously ended
the domination of the concept of locus delicti for constitutional purposes and introduced in its
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Hague Court may have over-read that aspect of Alaska Packers. Isolated facts are the stuff of which contacts are made. The ritualism of
the traditional concepts of conflict of laws theory should not be replaced by an equally ritualistic derogation of those concepts. The
essential goal is to find state interests adequate to support the selection
of lex fori and, absent such interests to require the forum to apply the
law of the state whose interests are truly significant.
Charles Edward Reuther

stead the idea that the validity of the selection of lex Jori depends upon whether the forum has
legitimate interests. In Alaska Packers, the Court upheld the application of California law to a
suit based upon an injury sustained in Alaska.

